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Corporate Social Performance and Use of Debt: an Examination of Australian 
Companies 
Abstract 
This study examines whether the corporate social performance (CSP) activities of firms influence the 
structure of debt in the Australian context. Long-term debt is often associated with higher monitoring by 
lenders, which suggests that firms may benefit from using long-term debt strategically. Short-term debt 
arises from regular business dealings with a number of primary stakeholders such as customers, 
suppliers, employees and lenders. We propose in this study that businesses that are committed to 
improving CSP outcomes may reduce use of short-term debt contributing to building sustainable long-
term relationships with the primary stakeholders. We therefore investigate whether firms that prioritise 
CSP favour long-term debt or short-term debt. Using a sample of Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) 
listed firms, this study finds that the level of CSP is not associated with long-term debt use, but there is a 
significant negative association between CSP and the short-term debt usage. This finding suggests that 
firms with stakeholder-friendly policies reduce their use of short-term debt rather than long-term debt. The 
reduced use of short-term debt helps resolve possible conflicts between the primary stakeholders and a 
firm, thus this study presents evidence supporting stakeholder theory and conflict-resolution hypothesis. 
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The deliberations on the ethical, environmental and social dimensions of business activities ebbed 
and flowed in business, academic and media circles for the past four decades (see for example, 
Mintzberg, 1983, Carroll, 1999, Kolk, 2016). More recently, attention has turned to how 
businesses address their responsibilities to all stakeholders instead of only the shareholders. The 
UN Global Compact, for example, calls on companies around the world to ‘align strategies and 
operations with universal principles of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption, 
and take actions that advance societal goals’ (United Nations Global Compact, 2019). Similarly, 
chief executive officers (CEOs) of nearly 200 large companies in the world redefined the purpose 
of a corporation through a statement issued by the Business Roundtable in August 2019 (Business 
Roundtable, 2019). This statement highlights the purpose of a corporation as ‘delivering value to 
customers’, ‘investing in our employees’, ‘dealing fairly and ethically with our suppliers’, 
‘supporting communities in which we work’ and ‘generating long-term value for shareholders’. 
As a result of this broader focus on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of businesses, there 
is a rapidly expanding literature related to measuring and reporting corporate social performance 
(CSP) (Cai et al., 2016). 
Many corporate collapses in Australia and elsewhere have left  stakeholders bearing the financial 
burden (Zona et al., 2013), thus highlighting the need for more research on the social performance 
of corporations. Most of the earlier CSP empirical literature analyses the influence of CSP 
activities on firms’ financial performance (see, for example, Beurden and Gössling, 2008, Lu et 
al., 2014, Shahzad and Sharfman, 2015). Financial performance, however, is a broad measure of 
various activities undertaken by firms which provides little information about specific impact of 
CSP activities on each of the several dimensions. Our purpose is to investigate the impact of CSP 
activities on a single dimension of corporate financial activities. While there is an extant literature 
that indirectly suggests linkages between certain aspects of CSP and use of debt, this study 
contributes to theory building and empirical validation of the association between a broader 
measure of CSP and use of short-term and long-term debt.  
Some of the earlier literature (Myers, 1977, Jensen, 1986, Titman and Wessels, 1988, Maksimovic 
and Titman, 1991) examines the use of debt and stakeholder relationships. The stakeholder theory 
of capital structure as proposed by Maksimovic and Titman (1991) suggests that customers, 
suppliers, employees, and other stakeholders bear the costs of liquidation of firms. Corporate firms, 
therefore, to encourage positive relationships with stakeholders, tend to employ lower debt levels. 
Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010) find that firms that value employee well-being employ lower 
levels of debt. Similarly, Bae et al. (2011) find that firms that are regarded as friendly to employees 
use lower levels of debt. Both these studies employ varying measures of employee-friendliness 
and different debt measures. While Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010) use total debt Bae et al. 
(2011) consider long-term debt. The total debt includes both short-term and long-term debt. The 
long-term debt is sourced from institutional investors as well as retail investors. The short-term 
debt includes accounts payables or trade creditors, employee benefits, borrowings, derivative 
financial liabilities, current tax payable and revenue received in advance. In other words, cash 
flows associated with short-term debt are associated with a number of stakeholders including 
suppliers, lenders, employees and customers. The interests of all these stakeholders may or may 
not be aligned. It is therefore important to consider both the short-term debt as well as the long-
term debt – i.e., the structure of debt. Similarly, a broader measure of corporate social performance 
that includes consideration of interests of employees and other stakeholders is critical in capturing 
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a holistic measure of corporate social activities. This study therefore extends research that links 
employee-friendliness with use of debt to consideration of a broader measure of CSP and use of 
both short-term and long-term debt. Unlike previous studies which focus on employees we 
consider a broader measure of CSP that includes activities relating to customers, suppliers and the 
community (primary stakeholders). This study therefore examines the use of debt by Australian 
firms and the role played by CSP in determining such choice.  
This study also aims to contribute to the CSP literature by focusing on the Australian context. The 
Australian corporate sector and capital market are characterised by the presence of strong 
institutions similar to that of the OECD countries. Employees in Australia are organized and often 
belong to a trade union or an industry association and their compensation and work conditions are 
determined largely through enterprise bargaining processes (Drago et al., 2007). Shareholders 
associations in Australia play an important advocacy role with both retail and institutional 
investors taking active interest in the annual general meetings (AGMs) of companies. These strong 
institutions encourage companies to improve their social outcomes while at the same achieving 
fair returns for both equity and debt investors. Given the enterprise bargain process in Australia, 
employees are also catered for in terms of appropriate compensation and opportunities for training 
and enhancing human capital which would benefit employees by helping them achieve career 
progression as well as helping companies derive benefits from higher employee motivation and 
productivity. We therefore investigate whether firms that prioritise CSP favour long-term debt or 
short-term debt or both.  
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: In the next section relevant literature is 
reviewed and the theoretical framework of this study is highlighted. A description of the empirical 
analysis undertaken along with a discussion of the findings of the study are presented in the 
penultimate section. The final section draws conclusions. 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
The use of the term CSP can be traced back to the mid-1970s (Sethi, 1975, Wartick and Cochran, 
1985, Carroll, 1999). Wood (1991, p. 693) defined CSP as ‘a business organization’s configuration 
of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, programs 
and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s societal relationships’. Marom (2006) defined 
CSP as the way businesses interpret and put CSR into practice. According to Beurden and Gössling 
(2008), CSP assesses companies’ ‘general stance with respect to a complex range of concerns 
relevant to the social field’ (p. 409). For Shahzad et al. (2015), CSP is concerned with the outcomes 
of activities undertaken to fulfil a corporation’s CSR and it is the corporate governance 
mechanisms within the firm that assist managers in finding the appropriate balance between the 
claims of shareholders and other stakeholders. Gond and Crane (2010) take stock of the theoretical 
developments and empirical research on CSP and point out that as a broad or universal construct, 
CSP still lacks ‘strong theoretical foundations and empirical validity’ (p. 1). They also suggest that 
a way forward is to acknowledge the non-testability of the universal construct and ‘move to an 
approach that incorporates more inductive elements - that is, where empirical work is actively 
incorporated into concept development and where theory is also built from data and not in 
insolation from it’ (p. 18).  This research is based on an inductive approach and contributes to 
empirical literature related to CSP by focusing on activities that companies engage in to achieve 
outcomes relating to CSP.  




2.1 CSR and financial performance 
A vast amount of prior literature analyses the relationship between CSR and firm performance 
(Scholtens, 2007, Jo and Harjoto, 2011, Ntim and Soobaroyen, 2013). The motivations for firms 
to undertake CSR activities are considered in several studies. Harjoto and Jo (2011), for example, 
identify four reasons commonly identified that relate to reputation building, a strategic choice that 
leads to reduced probability of CEO turnover, signalling the quality of the firm through CSR 
activities and to reduce the conflicts of interest between ‘non-investing stakeholders’ and 
managers. However, in their large sample of US firms for the period 1993 to 2004, these 
researchers only found strong evidence to support the conflict-resolution hypothesis. In their 
review of 34 publications related to the benefits of CSP covering the period 1990 to 2007, Beurden 
and Gössling (2008) concluded there is clear evidence that there is a positive correlation between 
CSP and corporate financial performance. (Lee et al., 2009) find that corporate social performance 
and financial performance have a negative relationship when stock returns are employed as a proxy 
for financial performance. Mattingly (2015) summarised the results of over 100 studies that 
employ Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) social ratings data and noted the differences in the 
empirical results of the relationship between accounting and stock market measures of financial 
performance and corporate social performance. Mattingly concludes that most of the studies that 
employ accounting measures of performance show evidence of positive relationship between 
corporate social performance and financial performance while this was not supported by studies 
employing stock returns.  
In related research, Rees and Rodionova (2015) find that governance arrangements perform a 
mediating role on the relationship between ownership and environmental and social performance 
of a large sample of firms from 46 countries for the period 2002 to 2012.  When controlled for 
governance they find that family ownership has a significant negative influence on environmental 
and social performance in economies with dominant stock markets and strong focus on 
shareholders and managers. Different types of ownership may have varying moderating influence 
on the relationship between CSR and performance. For a sample of European firms from 16 
countries, Dam and Scholtens (2012) find that ownership by individuals, employees and 
corporations have a negative influence on performance while ownership by banks and institutional 
investors and governments have no influence on the performance in 2005. Similarly, Ntim and 
Soobaroyen (2013) find that CSR practices in combination with improved corporate governance 
have a more pronounced positive effect on financial performance compared to stand alone 
improvements in CSR practices for a sample of 291 non-financial firms listed on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange for the period 2002 to 2009.  
Previous studies in the Australian context examine certain dimensions of CSR. (Moroney et al., 
2012) analyses the role of assurance in improving the quality of environmental disclosure in a 
sample of 74 Australian companies for the period 2003 to 2007. Young and Marais (2012) find 
that the CSR reporting practices of Australian firms are relatively weaker compared to firms in 
France and that the CSR reporting in high-risk industries is generally extensive compared to low-
risk industries. Jones et al. (2007) consider the role of CSR on labour policies of two mining firms 
in Australia and point out the lack of evidence that implementing a CSR strategy results in a 
fundamental change in the management of employment relations. Galbreath (2016) finds that CSR 
is positively associated with the financial performance of a sample of Australian firms for the year 
2004-2005.  
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Very few studies, Australian or international, focus on the relationship between CSP and use of 
debt.   
2.2 CSP and use of debt 
The extant literature exploring factors that explain corporate use of debt does not specifically 
explore the relationships between CSP and debt. Starting with the seminal works of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958), Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), Jensen (1986), several studies examine 
the role of capital structure or the extent of debt on the value of firms. The relationship between 
capital structure and stakeholder relationships was the focus of some of these studies (see for 
example, Myers, 1977, Jensen, 1986, Titman and Wessels, 1988, Maksimovic and Titman, 1991). 
Employees in particular, have a substantial and often non-diversified investment of human capital 
when working for a firm.  Employees are likely to lose not only income but also non-pecuniary 
benefits when firms that they work for are liquidated (Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010). Similarly, 
Jacobson et al. (1993) find that bankruptcy leads to loss of income and ‘firm-specific human 
capital’ for employees and that workers in distressed firms start facing the consequences even prior 
to liquidation. Verwijmeren and Derwall (2010) find that firms that ranked high in terms of 
employee well-being operate at lower levels of debt. They also find that firms that rank highly on 
employee well-being have higher credit ratings even after controlling for levels of debt. Bae et al. 
(2011) synthesize the relationships between employee-friendliness and debt usage. They identify 
three strands of literature. First, the stakeholder theory of capital structure choice as proposed by 
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) suggests that employees, suppliers and other stakeholders bear 
both direct and indirect costs of liquidation of firms and therefore as a way to encourage investment 
in relationships by stakeholders, firms may employ lower debt levels. Second, the theory of agency 
costs of debt and capital structure as proposed by Myers (1977) introduces the idea of 
underinvestment. Firms may forego profitable investments when the payoffs from the new 
investments afford more benefits to certain stakeholders. For instance, investment in employee 
training and development may add long-term value to the firm, but firms may underinvest in these 
projects when the benefits are perceived to be accruing more to employees than to the firms.  Third, 
the overinvestment problem of capital structure as proposed by Jensen (1986) suggests that firms 
with an excess free cash flow may undertake more investments in employee related projects even 
though these projects have negative net present values.  
2.3 CSP and cost of debt 
Another closely related strand of literature considers the influence of CSR and CSP on cost of 
capital (see for example, Sharfman and Fernando, 2008, El Ghoul et al., 2011, Ye and Zhang, 
2011, Chava, 2014). Firms that perform well in relation to CSR or CSP pose a lower risk and 
investors are therefore willing to accept lower returns on such investments leading to a reduced 
cost of capital for firms. Sharfman and Fernando (2008) show a reduction in the cost of capital for 
a sample of US firms that improved their environmental risk management. The reduced cost of 
capital allows firms to replace some equity financing with additional debt and realize tax benefits 
for the firm and its investors. However, the relationship between CSR and cost of capital is not 
always direct. Firms may have an optimal CSR investment level and when the actual CSR 
investment is lower than this optimal level, the cost of debt capital may be lower. When CSR 
investment exceeds the optimal level, the cost of capital may increase. Ye and Zhang (2011) show 
evidence of a non-linear relationship between CSR investment and cost of debt capital for a sample 
of Chinese firms. Their findings suggest that CSR investments may not always lead to substitution 




of equity with debt financing. The study by El Ghoul et al. (2011) finds a reduction in cost of 
equity capital for a sample of US firms with better CSR scores. These findings suggest that a 
reduction in the cost of equity capital makes debt financing less attractive. 
2.4 CSP and use of debt – hypotheses development 
Figure 1 traces the possible associations between CSP and debt. Long-term debt capital is secured 
from both institutional and retail lenders even though in the Australian context, there is very little 
retail debt issued by businesses through issue of corporate bonds. Long-term lenders face risks of 
changes in credit quality that arises due to business-specific changes as well as macroeconomic 
changes. Short-term debt relates to day-to-day activities of businesses. It includes accounts 
payables or trade creditors, employee benefits, borrowings, derivative financial liabilities, current 
tax payable and revenue received in advance. A number of primary stakeholders including 
suppliers, lenders, employees and customers are associated with short-term debt. Agency theory 
(Jensen, 1986) and conflict resolution hypotheses (Jensen, 2001, Jensen, 2002, Scherer et al., 2006, 
Verwijmeren and Derwall, 2010) highlight the possible conflicts of interest between these 
stakeholders and shareholders. In addition to these two theories, the stakeholder theory 
(Maksimovic and Titman, 1991, Bae et al., 2011) highlights the need for aligning interests and 
pursue common goals including social responsibility imperatives. Employees, suppliers and other 
stakeholders face both direct and indirect costs of liquidation of firms. The stakeholder theory 
(Maksimovic and Titman, 1991) proposes that firms employ lower debt levels in order to develop 
trust and long-term sustainable relationships with stakeholders.  
Businesses undertake CSP activities with an aim to develop ‘trust and loyalty’ in their relationships 
with employees, customers, suppliers and the community in which they operate. CSP activities 
include product responsibility, and health and safety of customers; trust and commitment in 
dealings with suppliers including investments in building sustainable supply chains; occupational 
health and safety, and training and development of employees including employees working in 
value chains; and community welfare and development including all forms of diversity, equal 
opportunity, and human rights. CSP activities therefore address some of the concerns relating to 
conflict of interests between shareholders and stakeholders including lenders.  
Given the differences in stakeholders associated with the short-term and long-term debt, it is 
imperative to consider possible associations between CSP and short-term debt and CSP and long-
term debt. As considered previously, short-term debt arises from regular business dealings with a 
number of primary stakeholders such as customers, suppliers, employees and lenders. Short-term 
debt as described earlier consists of trade and other payables, employee benefits, borrowings, 
derivative financial liabilities, current tax payable and revenue received in advance. Some of these 
sources have a direct interest cost while others represent costs of doing business. Corporate firms 
have choices in regards to their dealings with suppliers of short-term credit as well as other 
stakeholders who provide goods or services. We propose that firms that improve their social 
performance derive the twin benefits of improved and sustainable long-term relationships with the 
primary stakeholders as well as efficiencies arising out of trust and closer relationships with 
suppliers and other stakeholders. In addition, firms derive the benefits of improved productivity as 
a result of the investments that they make in employee training and development as well as general 
employee and community welfare. Extant literature in Australia and overseas supports the positive 
benefits of employee training on improving productivity and accruing gains both to employees and 
the firms (Black and Lynch, 1996, Blandy et al., 2000, Ballot et al., 2006). In the Australian 
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context, there is a strong role for employee unions in determining work conditions resulting in 
investments in employee development which further lead to improved efficiencies. Improved 
employee productivity and efficiency makes it possible for firms to achieve efficiencies in working 
capital management and therefore firms that have better CSP investments may reduce short-term 
debt. This study therefore hypothesizes that CSP has a significant negative association with the 
use of short-term debt of Australian firms as shown by the solid line in Figure 1. We therefore test 
the following null hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: There is no association between CSP and short-term debt.  
A negative association between CSP and short-term debt supports both the stakeholder theory 
and the conflict resolution hypothesis. 
The theory of agency costs of debt and capital structure as proposed by Myers (1977) introduces 
the idea of underinvestment. Firms may forego profitable investments when the payoffs from the 
new investments afford more benefits to certain stakeholders such as employees and lenders. For 
instance, investment in employee training and development may add long-term value to the firm, 
but firms may underinvest in these projects when the benefits are perceived to be accruing more 
to employees than to the firms. Similarly firms may forego positive net present value investment 
opportunities when the cash flows generated are used predominantly to service lenders interest and 
principal repayments. In these situations, employees and lenders confront similar cash flow 
uncertainties. The overinvestment problem of capital structure as proposed by Jensen (1986) 
suggests that firms with an excess free cash flow may undertake more investments in employee 
related projects even though these projects have negative net present values. D’Mello and Miranda 
(2010) provide empirical evidence that increased debt reduces overinvestment problem in 
businesses. Long-term debt is associated with higher disciplinary benefits (Jensen, 1986), which 
suggests that firms may benefit from using long-term debt strategically. Businesses may increase 
long-term debt as a means to have a better bargaining position with employees (Bronars and Deere, 
1991). Similarly, businesses may hold high proportions of debt when faced with customers and 
suppliers who are large and have a higher bargaining power (Kale and Shahrur, 2007). In summary, 
long-term debt is associated with issues of underinvestment, overinvestment and disciplinary 
benefits. Some stakeholder interests are served well with a larger proportion of long-term debt, 
while other stakeholder interests are not served well with long-term debt. Therefore, long-term 
debt may have a positive or negative association or no association with corporate social 
performance as highlighted with a dotted line in Figure 1. There we propose the following null 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: There is no association between CSP and long-term debt. 
3. Empirical framework and findings   
The sample for this study consists of all Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed firms covered 
in the Asset 4 ESG Database excluding the financial firms for the period 2004 to 2014. This sample 
addresses sample-selection bias pointed out by Shahzad and Sharfman (2015) when only those 
firms that engage in CSP are included. Financial firms are excluded because of their unique capital 








































The final sample consists of the 236 non-financial firms (covering 1464 observations) listed on 
the ASX with a valid CSP score. The sample comes from various sectors of the economy – basic 
materials (36%), consumer cyclicals (15%), consumer non-cyclicals (6%), energy (17%), 
healthcare (5%), industrials (15%), technology (2%), telecommunications (2%) and utilities (2%).  
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the study. The firms in 
the study are typically large with an average $4.6 billion (all dollar values refer to Australian 
dollars) in total assets including tangible assets of $2.29 billion and cash and other equivalent 
short-term assets of $0.36 billion. These firms have an average of $1.24 billion in total debt of 
which $1 billion is long-term debt. The firms in the study have average revenue of $3.3 billion and 
$0.45 billion of selling and general administrative expenses. These firms are typically profitable 
with average earnings before interest, depreciation and amortization of $0.68 billion and with 
estimated average franking credits due to tax imputation of $0.77 billion.  
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
Total Assets 1455 4599.087 13138.500 
Long-term Debt 1456 1062.157 3146.472 
Total Debt 1456 1237.495 3683.253 
NPPE 1454 2286.037 8394.877 
Cash 1455 362.549 1123.473 
Sales 1454 3343.091 8794.722 
SGA 902 446.143 1273.703 
EBITDA 1429 675.767 2758.457 
Franking Credits 1459 768.392 3910.735 
LevBVLT 1456 0.165 0.160 
LevBVST 1456 0.041 0.107 
LevBVTD 1456 0.206 0.188 
LevMVLT 1445 0.154 0.162 
LevMVST 1449 0.038 0.079 
LevMVTD 1445 0.192 0.186 
CSP 1464 0.375 0.277 
Growth 1444 1.716 1.759 
Size 1455 7.020 1.683 
RoA 1442 0.029 0.217 
Tangibility 1454 0.389 0.277 
Slack  1455 0.145 0.169 
Attainment Discrepancy 1435 -0.037 0.195 
SGA to Sales 897 0.026 0.313 
SD 1443 0.237 0.745 
Interest Rate Spread 1397 0.003 0.008 
WACC 1385 0.108 0.038 
Board Size 1351 7.036 2.091 
Board Independence 1235 0.603 0.228 
CEO Duality 1352 0.052 0.222 
Board Diversity 1351 0.457 0.289 
Board Attendance 1331 0.960 0.052 
Employee Ownership 1459 0.032 0.091 
Institutional Ownership 1459 0.095 0.109 




LT Debt is long-term debt with maturity of more than one year. Total Debt is the total of long and 
short-term debt. NPPE is computed as the net property, plant and equipment. Cash is the sum of 
cash and short-term investments. Sales is the sales revenue. SGA represents expenses relating to 
selling, general and administrative functions. EBITDA is the earnings of a company before interest 
expense, income taxes and depreciation. These variables along with Total Assets are in millions of 
Australian dollars.  
 
Methodological approach  
Given the censored nature of the value of proportion of debt (lies between 0 and 1), it is 
inappropriate to use ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Tobit models employing maximum 
likelihood method yield consistent and unbiased estimates and therefore we employ them in a 
panel setting. The panel models help address the issues of unobserved heterogeneity (Baltagi, 
2008, Wooldridge, 2010). We use Stata 15 to examine the association between use of debt and 
CSP. There are feasibility concerns about estimation of Tobit models with fixed effects and no 
fixed effects Tobit model is available in Stata, given this, we employ panel Tobit random effects 
model (StataCorp, 2017). Long-term debt, short-term and total debt are regressed separately on 
CSP and a set of financial and governance variables identified in prior literature.  
Dependent variable 
Proportions of debt used is the main dependent variable employed in this study. To consider the 
significance of long-term and short-term debt separately, measures are estimated separately for 
both long-term debt and short-term debt. BVLT is long-term debt as a percentage of total assets 
and is calculated on a book value basis. BVST is short-term debt as a percentage of total assets 
and is calculated on a book value basis. BVTD is total debt expressed as a percentage of total 
assets and is calculated on a book value basis. MVLT is long-term debt expressed as a percentage 
of sum of total debt and market value of equity. MVST is short-term debt expressed as a percentage 
of sum of total debt and market value of equity. MVTD is total debt expressed as a percentage of 
sum of total debt and market value of equity.  
Debt levels generally increased until 2008 and fell during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Post-
GFC, debt on a book-value basis has remained in the range of 0.17 in 2011 to 0.20 in 2014 and 
debt on a market-value basis increased over the same period from 0.12 in 2011 to 0.16 in 2014. 
The sample firms employ approximately 20 percent of debt to fund their total assets, of which 80 
percent is funded by long-term debt both on book and market value bases. 
Explanatory and control variables 
CSP is the variable of critical importance in this study and is based on the social performance score 
from the Asset 4 ESG database. This measure is an indication of companies’ reputation and their 
‘social license’ to operate. It captures the ‘trust and loyalty’ enjoyed by a company in its 
relationships with employees, customers, suppliers and the community in general.  It covers areas 
such as community welfare and development (including all forms of diversity, equal opportunity, 
and human rights), supplier relationships, health and safety (of customers and employees working 
in value chain), product responsibility, and training and development of employees. The firms in 
the study have an average CSP score of 0.37 with a minimum of 0.04 and a maximum of 0.98 
(year-wise trends are available from authors on request). Their social performance increased from 
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0.45 in 2004 to 0.53 in 2008. In 2009 and 2010 there was a considerable decline to 0.33 and 0.34 
after which the average CSP remained in the range of 0.34 and 0.35. 
We employ traditional financial determinants of debt as explanatory variables in this study. 
Growth is calculated as a ratio of market value to book value. Size is calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the total assets. RoA is the return on assets. Tangibility is calculated as a ratio of the 
net property, plant and equipment to total assets. SGA to Sales is calculated as a ratio of selling 
and general administrative expenses to sales. SD is the standard deviation of EBIT for the last 5 
years. RD Dummy takes a value of 1 when R&D investments is reported and 0 otherwise.  
Australia has a tax imputation system where by double taxation of corporate profits in the hands 
of companies and shareholders is avoided. To account for possible effects of dividends on debt, 
we employ franking credits accumulated by firms as a control variable. We estimate franking 
credits based on the cumulative taxes paid and the franking credits distributed to domestic 
shareholders. Information on financial variables was collected from the Worldscope database as 
well as annual reports of the companies. 
Apart from the traditional financial variables such as growth, size, profitability, tangibility and 
taxes, other factors such as macroeconomic conditions and weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) may influence the proportion of debt used by firms. Changes in economic conditions 
may also affect both short-term and long-term interest rates as well as the availability of slack 
resources for firms to undertake investment in CSP activities. Without controlling for these factors, 
it is difficult to isolate the influences of CSP on the use of debt. In this study we control for the 
traditional financial variables as well as for interest rate spread and WACC following El Ghoul et 
al. (2011), Ye and Zhang (2011). Interest rate spread is the difference in the yields of 10 year 
Government Bonds and 180 Day Bills. We estimate the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
based on estimates of cost of equity, cost of debt and proportions of debt and equity. Cost of equity 
is estimated using capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Beta is estimated based on monthly returns 
over a 5 year window. Cost of debt is estimated based on the average yields data collected from 
the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA).  
The sample firms had a WACC of 11 percent and the average term spread between long-term 
interest rates and short-term interest rates is 0 with short-term interest rates being higher in some 
and lower in other years.  
Following previous literature, we also control for governance (Rees and Rodionova, 2015) and 
ownership variables (Dam and Scholtens, 2012). Board size is the total number of directors on a 
board. Board Independence is calculated as a ratio of number of independent board members to 
total board members. CEO duality is a dummy variable that take a value of 1 when both the roles 
of CEO and chairperson are performed by the same person, and 0 otherwise. Board diversity 
captures the gender diversity of board members. Chairperson is ex CEO is a dummy variable and 
takes a value of 1 when a chairperson is a former CEO, and 0 otherwise. Board attendance is the 
proportion of board meetings attended by all board members. Employee ownership is the 
proportion of ownership held by employees and directors. Institutional ownership is the proportion 
of shareholding held by institutional investors. 
The firms in the study period had on average 7 board members, with 60 percent being independent. 
Attendance of the board members was high (96 percent) and only 4 percent of firms had the same 




person performing the dual roles of CEO and chairperson. In terms of ownership, employees held 
3 percent and institutions 16 percent.  
The relationship between CSP and use of debt is also not straightforward, for example, Arora and 
Dharwadkar (2011) demonstrate “that the association between corporate governance and CSR 
dimensions depends on differences in decision-making latitude originating from relative firm 
performance compared to those of peer firms” (p. 136). Thus we include a variable attainment 
discrepancy to control for relative performance compared to peers in the industry. Another 
important factor – organizational slack – may also influence CSP and financing patterns. Shahzad 
et al. (2016) find evidence of a negative relationship between financial slack and CSP for a sample 
of US firms. Slack is calculated as a ratio of cash and short-term assets to total assets. Attainment 
discrepancy is calculated as the difference between target profitability and profitability. Target 
profitability is estimated as the median profitability within an industry.  
The sample firms have an average growth (as measured by the ratio of market value to book value) 
of 1.72, a slack of 0.14 and an attainment discrepancy of -0.04. In approximately two-thirds of the 
sample firm-years dividends were paid and in about one-fifth of the firm-years losses were 
incurred.  
First correlations among the independent variables is considered for any possible multi-collinearity 
related issues. Table 2 shows no unusually high values of correlations and therefore all variables 
employed are considered appropriate. 
Empirical findings on the association between CSP and debt usage 
Table 3 presents the results of the analysis of the association between CSP and the use of debt 
measured on a book value basis. BVLT is long-term debt as a percentage of total assets and is 
calculated on a book value basis is employed as a dependent variable in Model 1. CSP has no 
significant association with the proportion of long-term debt utilised by the firms in the study. 
BVST is short-term debt as a percentage of total assets and is calculated on a book value basis is 
employed as a dependent variable in Model 2. CSP shows a significant negative association with 
the short-term debt of sample firms. BVTD is total debt expressed as a percentage of total assets 
and is calculated on a book value basis. It is employed as a dependent variable in Model 3. CSP 
has no significant association with total debt either.  
Table 4 presents results relating to the influence of CSP on debt measured on a market value basis.  
MVLT is long-term debt expressed as a percentage of sum of total debt and market value of equity 
is employed as a dependent variable in Model 4. MVST is short-term debt expressed as a 
percentage of sum of total debt and market value of equity is employed as a dependent variable in 
Model 5. MVTD is total debt expressed as a percentage of sum of total debt and market value of 
equity is employed as a dependent variable in Model 6.  
CSP has a significant negative association with short-term debt while it has no association with 




Table 2 Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
CSP 1.000                 
Growth -0.113 1.000                
Size 0.449 -0.269 1.000               
RoA 0.129 0.058 0.243 1.000              
Tangibility 0.066 -0.126 0.036 -0.116 1.000             
Slack -0.292 0.289 -0.473 -0.201 -0.159 1.000            
AttDis 0.055 -0.060 0.115 0.458 0.002 -0.094 1.000           
SGA -0.060 0.023 -0.089 -0.098 -0.037 0.117 -0.037 1.000          
Franking  0.482 -0.075 0.481 0.197 0.052 -0.281 0.098 -0.227 1.000         
SD 0.298 -0.084 0.470 0.067 0.135 -0.083 0.024 -0.036 0.434 1.000        
Rate Spread -0.111 -0.038 -0.168 -0.079 0.035 0.072 0.026 -0.021 -0.120 -0.044 1.000       
WACC -0.287 0.169 -0.395 -0.101 0.070 0.378 -0.047 0.163 -0.342 -0.068 -0.079 1.000      
Brd Size 0.408 -0.076 0.493 0.098 0.002 -0.298 0.033 -0.047 0.489 0.425 -0.160 -0.272 1.000     
Brd Ind 0.365 -0.027 0.254 0.071 -0.049 -0.180 0.032 -0.064 0.209 0.097 -0.031 -0.236 0.042 1.000    
Brd Div 0.388 -0.057 0.348 0.047 -0.145 -0.208 0.022 0.004 0.377 0.113 -0.067 -0.250 0.261 0.323 1.000   
Brd Att 0.075 0.044 0.005 0.117 -0.134 0.023 0.069 -0.042 0.080 -0.052 -0.006 -0.038 -0.114 0.214 0.119 1.000  
Institutional  -0.018 -0.011 0.012 0.075 -0.267 -0.082 0.049 -0.043 -0.039 -0.106 -0.063 -0.199 -0.026 0.162 0.144 0.029 1.000 
Employee  -0.129 0.032 -0.071 0.082 -0.078 0.021 -0.003 -0.015 -0.074 -0.042 -0.084 0.039 0.017 -0.268 -0.097 -0.006 -0.064 
AttDis is Attainment discrepancy, SGA refers to SGA to sales, Franking is ln of Franking Credits, Rate Spread is Interest Rate Spread, Brd Size refers to Board Size, Brd Ind refers to 




Table 3 CSP and use of debt – Book value measures - Panel Tobit analysis Note: z statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.   
  Model (1) - BVLT Model (2) - BVST Model (3) - BVTD 
CSP 0.030 -0.041** 0.001 
 (1.14) (-2.41) (0.02) 
Growth 0.012*** 0.002 0.014*** 
 (3.41) (0.73) (4.09) 
Size 0.037*** 0.002 0.040*** 
 (4.87) (0.42) (5.04) 
RoA -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-0.27) (-7.31) (-5.89) 
Tangibility 0.057* -0.046** -0.031 
 (1.73) (-2.37) (-0.91) 
Slack -0.124*** 0.002 -0.098** 
 (-2.99) (0.07) (-2.34) 
Attainment Discrepancy 0.081** -0.057 0.030 
 (2.17) (-1.07) (0.84) 
SGA to Sales 0.003 -0.003** -0.000 
 (1.18) (-1.98) (-0.12) 
Ln Franking Credits -0.002 0.001 -0.003 
 (-0.46) (0.39) (-0.67) 
SD -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 
 (-2.06) (0.22) (-1.47) 
RD Dummy 0.025 0.027*** 0.058*** 
 (1.62) (2.87) (3.68) 
Interest Rate Spread -1.094** -0.235 -1.358*** 
 (-2.41) (-0.69) (-3.10) 
WACC -0.735*** -0.332*** -1.076*** 
 (-4.88) (-3.46) (-7.07) 
Board Size -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 
 (-0.85) (-0.42) (-1.57) 
Board Independence -0.023 0.006 -0.001 
 (-0.85) (0.34) (-0.04) 
CEO Duality 0.019 0.000 0.012 
 (0.63) (0.00) (0.40) 
Board Diversity 0.011 -0.013 0.005 
 (0.56) (-1.02) (0.26) 
Chairman Ex CEO 0.017 0.018 0.038** 
 (0.89) (1.43) (2.00) 
Board Attendance -0.062 0.107*** 0.059 
 (-1.20) (3.35) (1.12) 
Institutional Ownership 0.036 0.006 0.051 
 (0.86) (0.22) (1.24) 
Employee Ownership 0.052 0.026 0.070 
 (0.97) (0.73) (1.30) 
Post GFC -0.000 -0.009 -0.008 
 (-0.00) (-0.82) (-1.12) 
Sector Yes Yes Yes 
Loglikelihood 587.247 781.726 587.327 
χ2 546.627 219.955 651.393 
Probability 0.000  0.000 0.000 




Table 4 CSP and use of debt – Market value measures - Panel Tobit analysis 
 Model (4) - MVLT Model (5) - MVST Model (6) - MVTD 
CSP 0.029 -0.042** -0.000 
 (1.17) (-2.56) (-0.01) 
Growth -0.020*** -0.007*** -0.025*** 
 (-6.06) (-2.96) (-7.42) 
Size 0.041*** 0.005 0.045*** 
 (5.68) (1.21) (5.78) 
RoA -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-0.84) (-5.76) (-4.60) 
Tangibility 0.076** -0.032* 0.047 
 (2.36) (-1.72) (1.37) 
Slack -0.048 -0.007 -0.030 
 (-1.21) (-0.26) (-0.69) 
Attainment Discrepancy 0.042 -0.040 -0.001 
 (1.18) (-1.54) (-0.03) 
SGA to Sales 0.004* -0.001 0.004 
 (1.94) (-0.87) (1.46) 
Ln Franking Credits -0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (-0.56) (0.35) (0.03) 
SD -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.98) (0.12) (-1.44) 
RD Dummy 0.004 0.017* 0.016 
 (0.30) (1.80) (1.01) 
Interest Rate Spread -1.143*** -0.039 -1.210*** 
 (-2.68) (-0.12) (-2.71) 
WACC -0.672*** -0.318*** -1.012*** 
 (-4.72) (-3.43) (-6.59) 
Board Size -0.010*** -0.004* -0.017*** 
 (-2.81) (-1.86) (-4.44) 
Board Independence -0.037 -0.004 -0.035 
 (-1.45) (-0.26) (-1.27) 
CEO Duality 0.041 -0.019 0.022 
 (1.41) (-1.04) (0.72) 
Board Diversity 0.017 -0.000 0.025 
 (0.97) (-0.01) (1.33) 
Chairman Ex CEO -0.003 0.023* 0.016 
 (-0.18) (1.94) (0.85) 
Board Attendance -0.015 0.107*** 0.092* 
 (-0.30) (3.44) (1.73) 
Institutional Ownership -0.050 0.020 -0.019 
 (-1.26) (0.72) (-0.45) 
Employee Ownership 0.009 0.012 0.004 
 (0.17) (0.36) (0.08) 
Post GFC 0.009 0.001 0.004 
 (1.27) (0.17) (0.55) 
Sector Yes Yes Yes 
Loglikelihood 621.256 823.025 584.104 








Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: z statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively. 
 
Discussion of Findings 
From the results presented above, it is clear that CSP has no significant association with the total 
debt or the long-term debt of the firms in the study. These findings, on the surface, appear to 
contradict the earlier findings of (Bae et al., 2011) who find that firms with better employee 
treatment practices maintain lower levels of debt.  However, given the similarities in the payoffs 
to the primary stakeholders, CSP and long-term and total debt may not have any negative 
association. These findings are also broadly consistent with CSR and cost of capital literature 
(Sharfman and Fernando, 2008, El Ghoul et al., 2011, Ye and Zhang, 2011). Payoffs to short-term 
lenders and other primary stakeholders differ considerably and firms’ reliance on short-term debt 
may lead to additional agency problems particularly for those primary stakeholders who are not in 
a position to influence the use of free cash flows. Therefore the hypothesis that CSP has a 
significant negative association with short-term debt is confirmed. Firms that look after their 
primary stakeholders reduce short-term debt levels as a way to provide assurance to these 
stakeholders that value creation focuses on long-term assets and the funding of long-term assets is 
undertaken through long-term sources rather than short-term sources.   
Discussion of findings relating to other explanatory and control variables 
The traditional financial, governance and ownership factors identified in previous literature are 
included as controls for debt. These results are also presented in Tables 3 and 4 along with results 
relating to possible associations between CSP and debt.  
Consistent with previous studies, size has a significant positive association with total debt, and 
long-term debt. Larger companies are likely to be well-diversified and therefore less likely to face 
bankruptcy due to changes in economic conditions. Larger firms therefore employ more long-term 
debt in their capital structure compared to smaller firms which are subject to a higher probability 
of bankruptcy. This finding is consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995, Frank and Goyal, 2009). Consistent with findings from previous studies, this study 
finds that tangibility has a significant positive association with total long-term debt. The tangible 
assets are available as collateral thus enhancing opportunities for borrowing (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995). Higher tangibility may also imply lower default risk for lenders, thus making more debt 
available to firms (Haque et al., 2011). Tangibility, on the other hand, has a negative association 
with short-term debt, implying that firms with more collateral assets employ long-term debt rather 
than short-term debt.  
Growth has a varying association with debt depending on the way the latter is measured. Broadly, 
when debt was measured on a book value basis, growth has a positive influence whereas for market 
value measures of debt, growth has a negative influence. The findings relating to market value of 
debt are similar to Qiu and La (2010) who find support for a negative relationship between debt 
and growth for a sample of Australian firms. These findings are consistent with the view that 
profitable firms may rely on retained earnings to fund future growth and therefore employ lower 
levels of debt (Kayhan and Titman, 2007). Consistent with the trade-off theory, growth 
opportunities imply higher risk and firms raise less debt to ‘avoid issues of debt overhang’ (Myers, 
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1977). Dilution concerns may motivate firms to use debt rather than equity to fund growth 
opportunities (Du and Dai, 2005).  
This study finds that profitability has a significant negative association with the total debt as well 
as short-term debt and thus supports the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This 
finding is also consistent with the finding of Titman and Wessels (1988), who find that profitable 
firms have lower debt ratios.  
The degree of financial slack, on the other hand, has a significant negative association with the 
proportion of long-term debt as well as total debt employed. This is consistent with the notion that 
firms that have a higher degree of financial flexibility may employ other sources of funding rather 
than long-term debt. 
Board attendance has a positive association with the level of short-term debt while it has no 
association with long-term debt employed in the sample firms. The higher degree of monitoring 
by board members through regular attendance at board meetings results in lower use of short-term 
debt. Board size has a negative association with long-term and short-term debt measured on market 
value basis, consistent with (Jo and Harjoto, 2011). None of the other governance or ownership 
factors show any significant association with debt.   
 
4. Conclusion 
This study examines the influence of CSP on the total, long-term and short-term debt of a sample 
of Australian firms for the period 2004 to 2014. The average CSP score increased from 0.45 in 
2004 to 0.53 in 2008 and declined to 0.33 in 2009. It remained around this level in subsequent 
years. Sample firms employed approximately 20 percent of debt to fund their total assets and 
approximately four-fifths of total assets are funded by long-term debt both on book and market 
value bases. Debt levels generally increased until 2008 and fell during the GFC. Post-GFC, debt 
on a book-value (market value) basis has remained in the range of 0.17 (0.12) in 2011 to 0.20 
(0.16) in 2014. The level of CSP shows no effect on long-term and total debt usage while it exerts 
a significant negative association with the short-term debt usage of sample firms. All financial and 
governance factors show influences that are consistent with previous studies. CSP has a significant 
negative association with the short-term debt use of sample firms even after controlling for 
financial, governance and ownership factors. This finding suggests that firms with employee-
friendly policies reduce their short-term debt rather than long-term debt or total debt. Given the 
similarities in the pay-offs of the primary stakeholders and the monitoring benefits provided by 
long-term debt, firms that commit to the interests of primary stakeholders reduce the short-term 
debt usage rather than long-term debt use. 




This study has implications for stakeholder theory, trade-off theory and pecking order theory. 
While traditional financial variables included in this study show that the debt decisions of firms is 
consistent with trade-off theory and pecking order theory, the negative effect of CSP highlights 
the significance of stakeholder theory for capital structure choice. This latter finding is also 
consistent with the conflict-resolution hypothesis.   
This study has important insights for corporate executives, investors and CSR advocates as well 
as policy makers concerned with corporate governance and stakeholder management and 
protection. In addition to the amount of debt, the type of debt utilised has implications for primary 
stakeholders. Corporate firms may reduce short-term debt in preference to long-term debt in order 
to demonstrate their commitment to CSP activities. Similarly, investors and CSR advocates need 
to consider the financial choices made by companies more thoroughly paying particular attention 
to the structure of indebtedness. These findings could also inform the development and 
implementation of appropriate voluntary and non-voluntary governance initiatives by policy 
makers that facilitate enhanced CSP.   
The focus of this study is the influence of CSP on the use of debt and not on the potential influence 
of debt on CSP about which there is no consensus. Further research may explore this relationship 
in more detail. Future studies may also directly quantify investments in CSP as well as possible 
reductions in costs of doing business for corporate firms in addition to focusing on the relationships 
between specific components of working capital and CSP.  
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